Dartmouth College

Dartmouth Digital Commons
Dartmouth Scholarship

Faculty Work

7-23-2016

Individual Differences in Response of Dorsomedial Prefrontal
Cortex Predict Daily Social Behavior
Katherine E. Powers
Dartmouth College

Robert S. Chavez
Dartmouth College

Todd F. Heatherton
Dartmouth College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa
Part of the Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Commons

Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation
Powers, Katherine E.; Chavez, Robert S.; and Heatherton, Todd F., "Individual Differences in Response of
Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex Predict Daily Social Behavior" (2016). Dartmouth Scholarship. 3806.
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/3806

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu.

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, 121–126
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsv096
Advance Access Publication Date: 23 July 2015
Original Article

Individual differences in response of dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex predict daily social behavior
Katherine E. Powers,1,2 Robert S. Chavez,1,3 and Todd F. Heatherton1
1

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, NH, USA, 2Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA and 3Department of
Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Correspondence should be addressed to Katherine E. Powers, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Northwest Science Building, Room 280.14, 52
Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-mail: kpowers@fas.harvard.edu.

Abstract
The capacity to accurately infer the thoughts and intentions of other people is critical for effective social interaction, and
neural activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) has long been linked with the extent to which people engage in
mental state attribution. In this study, we combined functional neuroimaging and experience sampling methodologies to
test the predictive value of this neural response for daily social behaviors. We found that individuals who displayed greater
activity in dmPFC when viewing social scenes spent more time around other people on a daily basis. These findings suggest
a specific role for the neural mechanisms that support the capacity to mentalize in guiding individuals toward situations
containing valuable social outcomes.
Key words: fMRI; mentalizing; theory of mind; social interaction; experience sampling

Introduction
The complex nature of human social interaction necessitates
the ability to recognize and infer the contents of other minds.
This sophisticated capability, also referred to as having theory
of mind or mentalizing, allows people to empathize with others,
to cooperate with others and to predict future behaviors (Frith
and Frith, 2001; Mitchell and Heatherton, 2009). In this way, the
capacity to represent others’ thoughts and intentions facilitates
the development and maintenance of harmonious social
interactions (Heatherton, 2011), which is critical for survival
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995).
Functional neuroimaging research has reliably shown activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) when people
make social judgments and inferences about the minds of
other people (Mitchell et al., 2002, 2004, 2006; for review, see
Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of 107
studies revealed that dmPFC activation is consistently observed
in studies investigating the mental representation of knowledge
about other people (Denny et al., 2012). Although the dmPFC
has been broadly implicated in the neural representation

of others (Wagner et al., 2012), much of the work in the literature has focused on the role of this brain region in mental
state attribution or ‘mentalizing’. Along these lines, the
meta-analysis by Denny et al. (2012) showed that the
activity in dmPFC is greater when thinking about other
people relative to thinking about one’s self, further underscoring
the role of this particular brain region in social cognition specifically (see also Mitchell, 2008; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009).
Although the majority of research on the neural basis of
mentalizing has examined how people infer thoughts and intentions when explicitly instructed to do so, everyday social inferences often occur spontaneously as we encounter other
people in our social world. Recent neuroimaging studies have
shown that dmPFC is similarly recruited when people watch
video clips (Iacoboni et al., 2004) or simply view images (Wagner
et al., 2011) depicting social interactions, suggesting a role for
dmPFC in spontaneous social cognition. Indeed, in more direct
investigations of the neural bases of spontaneous mentalizing,
Spiers and Maguire (2006) found that the dmPFC was reliably
engaged when participants were thinking about other people
they encountered in a virtual reality environment, according to
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retrospective reports. Other studies directly comparing dmPFC
activity during spontaneous (e.g. ‘read this statement’) and intentional (e.g. ‘infer this person’s trait’) judgments found that
both types of mentalizing judgments produce robust activity
in dmPFC and, critically, that the dmPFC response evoked by
spontaneous inferences closely parallels that evoked by explicit
inferences in both magnitude (Ma et al., 2010) and neural timing
as measured by event-related potentials (Van Duynslaeger et al.,
2007). Taken together, this work supports the proposition
that spontaneous and explicit mentalizing processes are subserved by a common neural network centered on the dmPFC
(Van Overwalle and Vandekerchkhove, 2013). By showing
that dmPFC activity is associated with spontaneous social
cognition, these findings suggest that this neural response may
reflect an attempt to understand the minds and intentions
of others.
From an evolutionary perspective, the capacity to mentalize
allows people to understand that they are the targets of social
evaluation and to adaptively react when social bonds
are threatened (Heatherton, 2011). Consistent with this interpretation, we recently provided evidence that experiencing threats to
social relationships modulates neural activity in dmPFC (Powers
et al., 2013). Specifically, we found that dmPFC subsequently exhibits more activity when viewed positive compared with negative social cues, suggesting that social exclusion motivates people
to mentalize about the positive aspects of their social worlds,
which may ultimately be important for re-establishing social connections. Other studies have found that dmPFC activity tracks
cues of social status (Muscatell et al., 2012) and is associated with
changes in self-esteem following social evaluation (Eisenberger
et al., 2011) thought to underlie the sociometer aspect of self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995). This work collectively demonstrates
that dmPFC activity is influenced by momentary assessments of
social relationship status and reflects differential motivations for
future social interactions. Taken together, these findings point to
a critical role of the dmPFC in underlying cognitive processes
aimed at forming social connections.
However, the extent to which this neural response in dmPFC
directly contributes to real-world behavioral tendencies to seek
out social contact and forge social bonds has not been empirically tested. A number of recent studies have demonstrated the
clear utility of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
predicting real-world outcomes, such as reductions in smoking
(Falk et al., 2011), consumer choices (Levy et al., 2011) and monetary donations (Ma et al., 2011). This growing trend to establish
links between neural markers and meaningful behavioral outcomes occurring outside of experimental sessions has important implications for understanding complex behaviors in
everyday situations that are distinct from those that can be
achieved through traditional laboratory tasks and self-report
measures (Berkman and Falk, 2013). In particular, experience
sampling methods afford the opportunity to capture especially
rich behavioral profiles of individuals over extended periods of
time (e.g. weeks), and researchers have successfully paired this
technology with fMRI to uncover unique, ecologically valid
brain–behavior relationships (Berkman et al., 2011; Lopez et al.,
2014).
In this study, we employed a similar approach integrating
fMRI and experience sampling methods to explicitly test the
predictive value of dmPFC activity for affiliative social behaviors. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the degree to
which individuals recruited this brain region when considering
other people would predict the degree to which they spent time
with other people on a daily basis.

Materials and methods
Participants
Forty Dartmouth College undergraduates were recruited for this
study. Six participants were dropped from the final analyses
due to poor task compliance during the scanning session (64%
response rate, n ¼ 1) or the weeklong experience sampling
period (37% response rate, n ¼ 2); inability to participate in the
experience sampling portion of the experiment due to smartphone compatibility issues (n ¼ 1) or poor fMRI signal quality as
indicated by signal to noise ratio (n ¼ 2). Examination of individual neural responses in dmPFC sensitive to social scenes (see
‘fMRI parameters and analysis’ for specific contrast description)
revealed the presence of one statistical outlier (defined as
62 s.d. from the mean), so data from this participant was also
discarded. This resulted in a final sample of 33 participants (23
female, age range 18–21 years). All participants were right
handed, native English speakers and had normal or correctedto-normal visual acuity. They were paid for their participation
and gave informed consent in accordance with the guidelines
set by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at
Dartmouth College.

Experimental design and procedure
The study consisted of one initial fMRI scanning session followed by a 1 week period of experience sampling of participants’ daily social behaviors.
fMRI session. Upon arrival for the fMRI scanning session, participants were told that this study was investigating the influence
of ecological perception on environmental situations and behavior. Participants then underwent fMRI scanning while viewing a series of pictures selected from the International Affective
Picture System (Lang et al., 2008) and categorizing each as an indoor or outdoor scene, a task chosen for its consistency with
the experimental cover story and to ensure that participants
were alert and attending to the stimuli. Critically, pictures varied on the dimension of sociality, in that they either contained
people (i.e. social scenes) or did not (i.e. non-social scenes;
images depicting food, landscapes and common objects). A total
of 180 pictures were presented for 2.5 s each. The order of the
pictures was pseudo-randomized and counterbalanced across
participants. In order to accurately estimate the hemodynamic
response function, pictures were intermixed with passive fixation trials of variable duration (0–10 s).
Following fMRI scanning, participants generated an estimate
of the size of their social network. Specifically, participants
were asked to list the number of individuals they regularly
spoke to (i.e. at least once every 2 weeks) either in person, on
the phone, online or via text (Brissette et al., 2000).
Experience sampling session. Following the fMRI scanning session, the experimenter set up participants’ smart phones for the
subsequent weeklong experience sampling portion of the experiment and provided participants with detailed instructions
on accessing and completing the surveys. The experience sampling protocol was administered via participants’ smart phones
using SurveySignal (http://www.surveysignal.com). Participants
were signaled seven times per day for seven consecutive days,
beginning the day after the fMRI session. Within each day, signals were distributed across a 14 h time period (9 am to 11 pm),
with each signal scheduled to occur randomly within consecutive 2 h blocks (Hektner et al., 2007; Lopez et al., 2014).
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A restriction was set so that any two signals could not occur
within 30 min of each other. If participants did not respond
within 10 min, a reminder would be sent for that particular signal. If the signal went unanswered for 30 min, the response was
logged as missing.
Responses to all answered signals were averaged across the
week-long period and an average score for each of the following
questions assessing frequency of social engagement was computed for each participant: ‘Are other people around you?’ (yes/
no) and ‘Are you interacting with other people?’ (yes/no). These
questions were part of a larger study examining everyday emotional and self-evaluative experiences and to maintain focus on
daily interpersonal social behavior; responses to the other questions administered are not reported here.

fMRI parameters and analysis
Structural and functional imaging was conducted at Dartmouth
College on a Philips Intera Achieva 3T scanner using a 32channel phased array coil. Structural images were acquired
using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE protocol (160 sagittal slices,
Repetition Time (TR) ¼ 9.9 ms, Echo Time (TE) ¼ 4.6 ms, 8 flip
angle, 1  1  1 mm voxels). Functional images were acquired in
an event-related design using a T2*-weighted echo-planar sequence (TR ¼ 2500 ms, TE ¼ 35 ms, 90 flip angle, field of
view ¼ 24 cm). Data were collected in 2 functional runs (36 axial
slices per volume, 3 mm thick, 0.5 mm gap, 3  3 mm in-plane
resolution), each consisting of 140 whole-brain volumes. An
Epson ELP-7000 LCD projector was used to project stimuli onto a
screen at the end of the magnet bore that participants viewed
via an angled mirror mounted on the head coil.
Neuroimaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using
SPM8. First, functional data were preprocessed using a standard
routine that corrected for differences in slice acquisition time,
realigned data within and across functional runs to correct for
head movement and unwarped to reduce residual movementrelated image distortions not corrected by realignment.
Functional data were then normalized into standard space
(3 mm isotropic voxels) based on the SPM8 EPI template that
conforms to the ICBM 152 brain template. Finally, normalized
data were spatially smoothed using a 6 mm full-width-at-halfmaximum Gaussian kernel.
To isolate neural responses specific to social scenes, a general
linear model incorporating task effects and covariates of noninterest was specified for each participant. Each regressor was
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function and
used to generate contrast images (weighted parameter estimates)
for each participant comparing neural responses to social scenes
with neural responses to non-social scenes. These contrast
images were then entered into a second-level random effects
analysis (False Discovery Rate (FDR) corrected, p < 0.05, k > 25).
Given our prespecified hypothesis involving dmPFC, our primary analysis interrogated regional hemodynamic responses
specifically within the region of dmPFC identified from this contrast. To do this, a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis was performed on parameter estimates (b) extracted by centering a
6 mm sphere on the voxels of peak dmPFC activation identified
by the social > non-social contrast described above (MNI coordinates 9, 54, 18). We note the close spatial similarity of this particular location with results from prior work implicating dmPFC
in spontaneous mentalizing (Wagner et al., 2011; Powers et al.,
2013). These parameter estimates were submitted to offline correlations testing the relationship with daily assessments of social behavior obtained via experience sampling. To test the
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specificity of this relationship, we also examined correlations of
activity within other brain regions demonstrating sensitivity to
social scenes by extracting parameter estimates from 6 mm
spherical ROIs centered on the peak voxels of the other clusters
that
emerged
from
the
social > non-social
contrast.
Importantly, as all ROIs were defined based on task-sensitive regions demonstrating a preference for social scenes, the correlations with daily assessments of social behavior obtained via
experience sampling are independent of the ROI selection
criteria.

Results
Brain regions sensitive to social scenes
A whole-brain analysis comparing regions that displayed a
greater response for social scenes compared with non-social
scenes for all participants revealed a system of brain regions
sensitive to social information, including the medial prefrontal
cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus extending to the medial
occipital gyrus and temporal poles (Figure 1A and Table 1).
Activity in these particular regions has been consistently and
robustly observed when participants view social scenes
(Iacoboni et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2011; Powers et al., 2013).

Experience sampling descriptives
Overall, compliance was high as participants responded to
75.9% of the signals sent over the 7 day experience sampling
period. On average, participants reported being around other
people 67.5% of the time (s.d. ¼ 9.1%, range 41.5–88.4%) and
interacting with people 44.6% of the time (s.d. ¼ 10.6%, range
23.3–68.8%). These two measures were significantly correlated
(r ¼ 0.45, p ¼ 0.009).

Predicting daily social behavior
As predicted, activity in dmPFC in response to viewing social
scenes correlated positively with social behavior, such that individuals who displayed greater activity in this region when viewing social scenes reported spending more time around other
people on a daily basis, r(33) ¼ 0.43, p ¼ 0.012, 95% confidence
interval (10 000 bootstrap samples) ¼ [.16–.64] (Figure 1B).
Although dmPFC activity did not significantly predict reports of
social interaction, the same positive relationship between the
two variables was observed (r ¼ 0.11, p ¼ 0.56).
To further clarify the observed significant relationship between dmPFC activity and time spent around other people, we
performed a few additional analyses. First, to argue that dmPFC
occupies a central role in determining the degree to which individuals spend time with other people, this relationship should
show specificity to dmPFC at the exclusion of other brain regions sensitive to social scenes. Indeed, additional ROI analyses
confirmed that no other regions that emerged from the contrast
identifying brain regions sensitive to social scenes in this study
demonstrated a significant correlation with time spent around
other people (all ps > 0.23).
We also tested whether the observed relationship between
dmPFC and daily social behavior could be explained by the size
of an individual’s social network. Estimates of the size of each
participant’s social network were marginally correlated with
time spent around other people (r ¼ 0.33, p ¼ 0.06), providing
confirmation that participants with large social networks do indeed tend to spend more time around other people on a daily
basis. However, there was no relationship between the size of
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Fig. 1. (A) Results from a whole-brain, random-effects analysis of all participants contrasting social scenes to non-social scenes (FDR corrected, p < 0.05). Statistical
maps of right medial hemisphere and right lateral hemisphere are overlaid onto inflated cortical renderings. Results reveal a network of regions, including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, that have been shown to consistently and reliably respond when participants view social scenes. (B) Results of a correlational analysis revealing that dmPFC response to social scenes significantly predicts the amount of time spent with other people, indexed via experience sampling (r ¼ 0.43, p ¼ 0.012). The
shaded area represents 95% confidence interval.

Table 1. Results of a whole-brain contrast identifying brain regions
sensitive to social scenes vs non-social scenes
Region

dmPFC
Temporal pole
Orbitofrontal cortex
Middle occipital gyrus
Middle occipital gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Inferior frontal gyrus
Cerebellum

Coordinates

t-value

x

y

z

9
66
3
51
51
45
33
45
3

54
3
51
72
78
0
6
24
78

18
24
21
3
9
45
45
15
27

5.11
4.70
4.83
14.01
11.54
5.39
4.67
4.42
5.88

Notes: Coordinates are reported in Montreal Neurological Institute stereotaxic
space. FDR corrected, p < 0.05, k > 25.

social network and dmPFC activity (r ¼ 0.03, p ¼ 0.86), suggesting
that the size of social network does not account for the brain–
behavior relationship we report here.

Discussion
As social beings, humans have an intrinsic motivation to affiliate and bond with one another (Bowlby, 1969; Baumeister and
Leary, 1995). In this study, we combined experience sampling
and neuroimaging methodologies to examine whether there is
a specific role for the neural mechanisms that support

mentalizing in guiding individuals toward situations containing
potentially valuable social outcomes.
Effective social behavior requires the ability to understand
the intentions and thoughts of those in our surrounding social
worlds. The involvement of dmPFC in tasks that explicitly require mentalizing about social knowledge has been well established (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2002, 2004, 2005,
2006; Gobbini et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2009), and recent work
has provided converging empirical support for the conclusion
that simply encountering social information similarly recruits
dmPFC in order to spontaneously extract person knowledge and
make sense of the minds of others (Spiers and Maguire, 2006;
Ma et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2011; Van Overwalle and
Vandekerckhove, 2013). Here, we extend the functional role of
this brain region by demonstrating that individual differences
in the reflexive engagement of this brain region when viewing
social information reliably predict time spent in social situations. That is, the magnitude of the response in dmPFC when
considering other people determined the degree to which these
individuals sought out social contact on a daily basis. Critically,
this predictive relationship was uniquely specific to dmPFC;
that is, no other brain regions that demonstrated sensitivity to
social scenes exhibited a significant relationship with daily social behavior. As increased attempts to accurately understand
what other people are thinking and feeling could facilitate attempts at social reconnection (Heatherton, 2011), the ability to
use these inferences to inform the implementation of goaldirected behavior may be particularly critical when social
relationships have been threatened. Consistent with this perspective, our prior work (Powers et al., 2013) shows recruitment
of dmPFC in response to motivationally relevant social cues

K. E. Powers et al.

following social exclusion, suggesting that these individuals are
drawing on this neural mechanism as they work to recover
broken social ties.
These findings demonstrate the importance of individual
differences in how people process and respond to social cues in
their everyday lives. More broadly, these results contribute to a
growing body of research linking dmPFC activity with real-world
social outcomes. Heightened dmPFC responsivity has also been
shown to predict altruistic behavior (Waytz et al., 2012), accuracy in empathic inferences (Zaki et al., 2009), decisions to pursue
romantic relationships (Cooper et al., 2012) and written gestures
of empathic concern (Masten et al., 2011). More recently, Spunt
et al. (2015) identified a relationship between activity in dmPFC
at rest to higher reported levels of social expertise, suggesting
that baseline functioning of this brain region contributes to the
ability to navigate daily social life. Taken together with this
study, these findings collectively highlight the specific functional role of this brain region in understanding complex social
situations and responding in flexible and adaptive ways.
Although the relationship between dmPFC activity and reports of social interaction did not reach significance, the behavior indexed by this question nevertheless showed a consistent
relationship with dmPFC response. It is noteworthy that, on
average, participants reported low to moderate levels of social
interaction. Thus, it is possible that the failure to capture
high levels of social interaction dampened the strength of this
particular effect. It is also possible that the phrasing of this
question produced confusing results in this sample of participants. A clear direction for future research is to examine
the specifics of social dynamics (e.g. precise nature of social interaction) as well as the influence of key personality variables (e.g. extraversion/introversion) on the findings we report
here.
Although our interpretation of dmPFC activity as an index
of social cognition is rooted in an extensive literature bridging
explicit and implicit mentalizing tasks, we note that dmPFC activity has been linked with a number of cognitive processes
other than inferring the mental states of other people (for
review, see Mitchell, 2009). In addition to carefully constraining
task design, future work may benefit from including measures
used in prior studies to successfully capture the cognitive
processes related to spontaneous mentalizing to strengthen
inferences regarding dmPFC function. Examples of such measures include retrospective reports (Spiers and Maguire, 2006)
and individual assessments of trait empathizing (Wagner et al.,
2011).
Our ability to forge and maintain social bonds is a fundamental aspect of the human experience. In this study, we
showed that individual differences in the reflexive engagement
of dmPFC possess predictive value for subsequent social behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, the sensitivity of this
neural system to social needs is adaptively beneficial, as it enables individuals to effectively navigate complex social environments and maximizes power to predict socially profitable
outcomes.
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